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I. INTRODUCTION

In a symposium on the history and legacy of President Hoover’s
National Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement, popularly
known as the Wickersham Commission, it is impossible to ignore
1
volume eleven, the Report on Lawlessness in Law Enforcement, and in
particular the more than half of the volume focused on abusive police
2
interrogation methods, the report entitled The Third Degree. This
report generated an immediate and dramatic response in 1931 when it
was published, and it has influenced ideas about policing for
generations.
Interestingly, though written by, and often read by, lawyers, The
Third Degree argues that politics—rather than law—is the most
promising tool for mitigating police misconduct:
For these evils many remedies have been proposed. Some of
them call for new legislation. But the law as it now stands is
sufficient. The difficulty is that it is either not enforced or is
deliberately disobeyed—and by the very persons charged with its
enforcement.
* Sullivan & Cromwell Professor of Law, University of Virginia School of Law. Thanks
to Adam Fleisher for his excellent research assistance.
1. NAT’L COMM’N ON LAW OBSERVANCE & ENFORCEMENT, REPORT ON
LAWLESSNESS IN LAW ENFORCEMENT (1931) [herinafter REPORT ON LAWLESNESS].
2. Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Walter H. Pollak & Carl S. Stern, The Third Degree, in
REPORT ON LAWLESSNESS, supra note 1, at 13.
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Statutes can not [sic] cope with the third degree nor can
police regulations. Without the will to enforce them, these
become words upon a printed page.
The real remedy lies in the will of the community. If the
community insists upon higher standards in police, prosecutors,
and judges, the third degree will cease to be a systematic
practice. 3
In the last paragraphs of the report, the three authors, led by
Harvard Law professor Zechariah Chafee, Jr., noted an essential and
non-legal precondition to political change generated by public concern:
But before the community can express its will it must know
when, how, and to what extent these abuses are perpetrated. To
this end certain things may prove of value:
Facts as to the detention and treatment of prisoners should
be made a matter of public record so that there may be a check
upon the charges of the prisoners on the one hand and upon the
denials of the police on the other. One way to accomplish this is
by keeping records of the times of arrest and detention; of the
places to which prisoners are taken; of the interviews of police or
prosecutors with prisoners; of the times at which interrogations
begin and end; of the visible injuries to prisoners. Although
there may be occasional failures to keep records and occasional
falsifications, a routine of this kind, once established, should
furnish a foundation of dependable information.
The press can accomplish much by constant publicity.
In every locality there should be some disinterested agency—
bar association, public or voluntary defender, or civic body—to
which a citizen, especially one who is poor and uninfluential, may
report abuses with the knowledge that he will be protected
against retaliation and that his complaint will be searchingly
investigated. 4
Thus, in discussing what could be done to improve police conduct,
The Third Degree advocated developing empirical evidence about
policing rather than refining the law.
The report itself furnished precisely the kind of concrete information
about police conduct it argued was necessary. Over time, the authors’
3. Id. at 191.
4. Id. at 191–92.
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considerable effort to establish the contours of the problem of abusive
police interrogation with persuasive detail and documentation has
probably had more impact than their legal analysis or policy proposals.
In the Supreme Court’s famous Miranda opinion, for example, decades
after the Wickersham Commission’s work, the Court cited the Report on
Lawlessness in Law Enforcement as clear evidence that abusive
interrogation practices “flourished,” at least when the report was
5
The Court went on to discuss policing manuals for
written.
contemporary evidence of interrogation practices, and implied in doing
so that similarly persuasive empirical evidence of police interrogation
6
practices after The Third Degree was simply unavailable. In a way, the
report’s influence vindicates Chafee and his co-authors: it suggests
dependable information about policing is crucial to governing the police
effectively and yet is difficult to find.
Though The Third Degree emphasized this point eighty years ago, in
this brief essay I argue that today we still lack enough information about
what the police do to shape their conduct effectively. Governing the
police through the local political process and regulating them under
state and federal law both require data about local conditions and the
costs and benefits of alternative policing strategies. Yet we lack that
7
data. The authors of The Third Degree understood well one of the
obstacles to developing that information—the opposition of some
officers. But they neglected other barriers, specifically, the reasons why
police chiefs, local public officials, state legislatures and agencies, and
federal actors do not require officers to collect and make accessible the
kind of data about policing required to inform the political and
regulatory process. Thus, The Third Degree failed to foresee our
present situation: data collection and research efforts that fall far short
of what we would need to make informed judgments about policing.
Until efforts to produce information about policing improve, our

5. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 445 & n.5 (1966) (quoting REPORT ON
LAWLESSNESS, supra note 1)); see also Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 571 n.2 (1961)
(citing the report’s most legal proposal for mitigating the problem of abusive interrogations);
Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156, 201–02 (1953) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
6. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 448 n.8.
7. I have noted other aspects of the data problem in policing policy and law elsewhere.
See, e.g., Rachel A. Harmon, The Problem of Policing, 110 MICH. L. REV. 761, 772, 797 n.139,
815 (2012) [hereinafter Harmon, The Problem]; Rachel A. Harmon, Promoting Civil Rights
Through Proactive Policing Reform, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1, 5, 28–34 (2009) [hereinafter
Harmon, Promoting Civil Rights].
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communities cannot “express [their] will” and the body of law
addressing the police—though much more extensive than that at the
time of the Commission’s work—may well equally risk being mere
“words upon a printed page.”
In Part I, I expand upon the work of The Third Degree’s authors by
describing how information about police conduct assists local
governance and state and federal regulation of policing. In Part II, I
argue that police chiefs and local government officials do not and are
unlikely to generate data about the police without external regulation.
In Part III, I contend that while existing federal law and agency efforts
provide for some data collection about policing, those efforts are flawed,
stymied by institutional and legal limitations. As a result, we do not
have the data we need to secure effective and rights-protecting policing.
II. THE ROLE OF INFORMATION IN SHAPING POLICE CONDUCT
The Third Degree authors advocated three means of securing and
distributing information about policing. First, they advocated creating
data about the big picture by requiring police to record their activities
and make those records available to the public. 8 Second, they argued
for incident-specific investigations of police conduct by “disinterested
9
agenc[ies].” And third, they pushed for distributing information about
10
police practices to the public through the press. These mechanisms are
11
important, but they are not always available, even today. Even if they
were, they would not provide information sufficient to guide political
judgment and policy on policing.
Policing in the United States is governed first and foremost by the
local political process. Local communities elect council members and
12
mayors who hire police chiefs and fund department budgets. Those
8. Chafee et al., supra note 2, at 191–92.
9. Id. at 192.
10. Id.
11. Police departments collect some data about their activities, but not as much as would
be useful, and they often share it only reluctantly with the public. See infra notes 30–40 and
accompanying text. Allegations of police misconduct get investigated, but intermittently, as
in federal lawsuits; inadequately, as by many civilian review boards; and internally, as by
administrative units in the police departments themselves. By contrast, the 24-hour news
cycle, the widespread availability of video recording in cell phones, and the development of
social media and video-sharing websites have resulted in a level of publicity for police
wrongdoing unimaginable at the time of the National Commission’s work.
12. For instance, in 2007 and 2008, aggregate local expenditures on police protection
were roughly $72.7 billion and $77.6 billion, respectively. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
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police chiefs and the limits of those budgets largely dictate how much
and what kinds of policing we have. State and federal law also regulate
the police, constraining the local process with law that prohibits some
police conduct; conditioning how officers may be hired, trained, and
13
Information is
managed; and discouraging wrongdoing by officers.
crucial both to governing the police effectively through local politics and
to the project of regulating them through state and federal law.
The voting public needs information about crime conditions, what its
police departments do, and the costs and benefits of alternative policing
practices, in order to develop and express preferences about policing in
elections and other political venues. New Yorkers, for example, cannot
easily decide whether to push for changes in the New York Police
Department’s stop-and-frisk policy if they do not know how many stopand-frisks take place, what those practices mean to individuals and
communities subject to them, what crimes stop-and-frisks deter or
detect and to what extent, and whether alternative, less-intrusive
policing strategies can equally serve the same goals.
Voters require similar kinds of information to uncover and mitigate
agency costs imposed by public officials. Police chiefs and mayors are
likely to provide too much, overly intrusive, or ill-chosen policing
practices if they experience reputational and political gains from doing
14
so. Critics recently accused Los Angeles Mayor Antonio Villaraigosa
of transferring officers from the General Services Department to the
Los Angeles Police Department in order to come closer to Villaraigosa’s
15
campaign pledge of increasing the department to 10,000 officers.
STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 2012 at 274 tbl.436 (2012). In the same
years, federal outlays for federal law enforcement activities were $19.6 billion and $24.6
billion, respectively (the amount has increased considerably since the September 11th
terrorist attacks). Id. at 312 tbl.473. And in those same years, all Department of Justice lawenforcement-related grants to local and state governments totaled roughly $3.1 billion and
$2.2 billion, respectively. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, FEDERAL AID TO STATES FOR FISCAL
YEAR 2007 at 15 tbl.1 (2008); U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, FEDERAL AID TO STATES FOR FISCAL
YEAR 2008 at 15 tbl.1 (2009).
13. See Harmon, The Problem, supra note 7, at 795.
14. See, e.g., Harmon, Promoting Civil Rights, supra note 7, at 46–47 (“Often the
economic and social costs and benefits to a city are not translated efficiently into economic
and political costs for the individual governmental actors, and in other cases, financial,
reputational, and professional costs and benefits to agents do not accrue efficiently to the
city.”).
15. See David Zahniser & Richard Winton, LAPD Force Tops 10,000, L.A. TIMES, Jan.
8, 2013, at AA1 (“‘It's an increase for show,’ said Kevin James, a candidate for mayor in the
March 5 election who has questioned Villaraigosa's LAPD hiring goals. ‘The mayor really
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Citizens can only decide whether such a management decision is serving
personal rather than public ends if they have a way to determine
whether it is unreasonably costly given its benefits. That determination
demands data about the economic and social costs of police practices,
and in this case, organizational strategies.
If data about crime rates and the costs and benefits of policing
practices are crucial to voters, they are equally important to police chiefs
and other high-ranking department officials who develop and
implement law enforcement strategies and procedures. In every
department, for example, a chief must decide whether to assign patrol
officers to traditional foot beats or to put them in cars. That allocation
depends in part on an assessment of the extent of local street crime and
how effective foot and mobile patrols are at stopping and deterring that
crime.
Whether informed or intuitive, implicit or express, chiefs make
dozens of cost-benefit decisions in running a department. They use
undercover officers, for example, if they believe them more effective at
addressing costly crimes than they are damaging of the public trust, and
engage in foot pursuits of non-violent criminals if they believe the law
enforcement benefits outweigh the risks of injury to officers. Without
research and data, those estimates will be unreliable, if not wildly wrong.
A similar argument can be made about city budgeting decisions for
police departments, policy choices made by chiefs and local
governments about daily police practices, and the like. For actors
making such decisions, data about crime and social disorder informs
where and what kind of policing objectives should be pursued; research
about the economic and social costs of alternative police practices
illuminate plausible means of pursuing those goals; and information
about existing police policies and practices reveals the potential costs of
changing direction.
Regulators need similar kinds of information. Legislatures and
administrative agencies often shape police conduct in order to
compensate for inadequate local protection of individual civil rights or
to reduce agency costs by local public officials. In order to have a basis
for pursuing those goals cost-effectively, state and national decisionwanted to get to 10,000 one way or the other before he left office, and this was the way he
could do it under the current budget constraints.’”); id. at AA2 (“Councilman Paul Koretz,
who opposed the layoffs, said the movement of the 60 building patrol officers to the LAPD
was ‘a little smoke and mirrors.’”).
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makers need information about local crime conditions and police
practices, national data for comparing localities, and research about the
costs and benefits policing alternatives and reforms.
The current policy debate over how police officers should use
conducted energy devices, such as Tasers, is illustrative. Some
advocates have argued that because of the danger Tasers pose, police
should use them more narrowly than existing practice in many
departments, limiting them only to circumstances when deadly force
16
If this goal were desirable, Congress might
would be permitted.
promote it by creating a grant program to subsidize Tasers in
departments with such policies, just as it presently provides funding for
body armor for police departments that adopt policies mandating that
17
officers wear that armor on patrol. Determining whether to create
such a program requires understanding the likely consequences of
alternative policy choices both for suspects and for law enforcement
objectives, including the physical risks of conducted energy devices on
18
suspects and whether officers are prone to overuse them. Without data
on these consequences, Congress has little reason to know whether new
programs are warranted.
Agencies also need data to regulate policing effectively. One
method the Department of Justice uses to promote constitutional
policing is to investigate and sue police departments that are engaged in
a pattern and practice of constitutional violations under 42 U.S.C.
§ 14141. In these suits, the Department seeks to negotiate an agreement
on a set of significant departmental reforms likely to prevent future
constitutional violations. The Department’s efforts under § 14141 will
only be as effective as the reform measures that it endorses in its
settlements. If the Department of Justice secures the wrong reforms, it
could increase a department’s costs or reduce its effectiveness without

16. E.g., STANFORD CRIMINAL JUSTICE CTR., USE OF TASERS BY LAW ENFORCEMENT
AGENCIES: GUIDELINES AND RECOMMENDATIONS 12 (2006); USA: Stricter Limits Urged as
Deaths Following Police Taser Use Reach 500, AMNESTY INT’L (Feb. 15, 2012),
http://www.amnesty.org/en/news/usa-stricter-limits-urged-deaths-following-police-taser-usereach-500-2012-02-15. As Amnesty International acknowledges, many of those deaths are
attributed to other causes. Id.
17. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, UPDATED FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS (FAQS) FOR
THE BVP PROGRAM MANDATORY WEAR REQUIREMENT (2011), available at
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bvpbasi/docs/FAQsBVPMandatoryWearPolicy.pdf.
18. See, e.g., NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, POLICE USE OF FORCE, TASERS AND OTHER
LESS-LETHAL WEAPONS 2 (2011).
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improving civil rights protection. 19 The Department of Justice, like
other legal actors who monitor and seek to influence police conduct,
cannot assess which remedial measures are likely to be most effective
and efficient without information about how particular policing
20
management practices affect police conduct and crime control.
State and federal actors need information about policing not only to
regulate the police directly, but also to promote cost-effective criminal
justice policy more broadly. Every state criminal law generates
additional police discretion to search or arrest suspects and, secondarily,
grants law enforcement authority to use physically coercive techniques
to conduct those searches and arrests or to protect an officer engaged in
them, if necessary. Every search, arrest, and use of force deprives a
citizen of privacy, autonomy, or bodily integrity, as well as imposing
often significant economic costs. These harms, imposed by the police,
are part of the cost of criminalizing additional conduct. But it is hard for
those contemplating expanding criminal law to consider such costs
effectively if they have no way to assess their extent. Similarly, state
criminal procedure laws, such as those mandating custodial arrests for
21
domestic violence misdemeanors, may deter future violations and
prevent continuing violence, but also may consume valuable police
resources and interfere with employment and immigration status for
those arrested.
Without some understanding of the effects of
19. See Harmon, Promoting Civil Rights, supra note 7, at 41.
20. Id. at 5, 34. Courts also regulate the police based on empirical conclusions. Fourth
Amendment doctrine, for example, requires courts to consider the nature of the intrusion on
the individual, the strength of the government’s interest in the intrusion, and the
consequences for law enforcement of various rules interpreting the Constitution’s
requirements for police searches and seizures. See, e.g., Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 408–
09 (2005); Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 449–50 (1990). Miranda doctrine
assumes warnings are effective to dispel the compulsion inherent in custodial police
interrogation. Without research on police practices, these conclusions are likely to be
supported only by intuition. See, e.g., Caballes, 543 U.S. at 409; id. at 411–13 (Souter, J.,
dissenting); Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 29–33 (2001); United States v. Mendenhall,
446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 741 (1979); Brown v. Texas, 443
U.S. 47, 50–51 (1979); Harmon, The Problem, supra note 7, at 769–71 (discussing empirical
and causal judgments courts must make in Fourth Amendment and Miranda law).
21. E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-38b(a) (West 2012) (“Whenever a peace officer
determines . . . that a family violence crime . . . has been committed . . . such officer shall
arrest the person or persons suspected of its commission and charge such person or persons
with the appropriate crime.”); D.C. CODE § 16-1031 (2012); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46:2140
(2012) (“Whenever a law enforcement officer has reason to believe that a family or
household member or dating partner has been abused, the officer shall immediately use all
reasonable means to prevent further abuse, including: [a]rresting the abusive party . . . .”).
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mandatory arrests on the incidence of domestic violence, on other law
enforcement goals, and on individual victims and suspects, states have
little basis for deciding whether to enact such a rule.
Even when state and federal actors legislate to serve broader
purposes, they frequently find judgments dependent on law
enforcement data unavoidable. For example, many federal statutes are
designed to protect individual privacy beyond the protection offered by
constitutional law. For each such statute, Congress must determine
whether law enforcement should be restricted from accessing the
22
personal information at issue differently than others. Thus, Congress
has exempted police from regulation in the Video Voyeurism
Prevention Act and the Telephone Records and Privacy Protection
23
Act; required law enforcement to make administrative requests for
information in the Electronic Communications Privacy Act and the
24
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act; and demanded a
warrant or subpoena before police gain access to information protected
25
by Title III of the Wiretap Act or the Video Privacy Protection Act.
These choices depend on assessments of how significant the protected
22. See Erin Murphy, The Politics of Privacy in the Criminal Justice System: Information
Disclosure, the Fourth Amendment, and Statutory Law Enforcement Exemptions, 111 MICH.
L. REV. 485, 494–99 (2013).
23. The Video Voyeurism Prevention Act of 2004, 18 U.S.C. § 1801(a) (2006), prohibits
the intentional capturing of an image of a private area of an individual without consent,
assuming the individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy. But it does not apply to law
enforcement. See § 1801(c) (“This section does not prohibit any lawful law enforcement,
correctional, or intelligence activity.”). Similarly, the Telephone Records and Privacy
Protection Act of 2006, 18 U.S.C. § 1039(a), bars the fraudulent obtaining of confidential
phone records but exempts law enforcement. See § 1039(g) (“This section does not prohibit
any lawfully authorized investigative, protective, or intelligence activity of a law enforcement
agency of the United States, a State, or political subdivision of a State, or of an intelligence
agency of the United States.”).
24. See Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, § 201(a),
100 Stat. 1848, 1861 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c)(1) (2006)); Health Insurance Portability
and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA), Pub. L. 104-191, § 3486(a)(1)(A), 110 Stat. 1936,
2018 (codified in 18 U.S.C. § 3486(a)(1)(A), 26 U.S.C., 29 U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C.); see also Fair
and Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 2003, Pub. L. 108-159, § 152(a), 117 Stat. 1964, 1964–
66 (2003) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1681c–2(f)).
25. See Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, § 802,
82 Stat. 212 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2518) (“Procedure for interception of wire,
oral, or electronic communications”); Video Privacy Protection Act, 18 U.S.C.
§ 2710(b)(2)(C) (codifying the warrant, subpoena, or court order requirement); 18 U.S.C.
§ 2710(b)(3) (requiring that any court order “issue only with prior notice to the consumer and
only if the law enforcement agency shows that there is probable cause to believe that the
records or other information sought are relevant to a legitimate law enforcement inquiry”).
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information is to criminal investigation, what role criminal investigation
plays in detecting and deterring crime, and how much individuals suffer
from police access to private information. Without the necessary
research and data, such analysis is guesswork .
As these examples suggest, several kinds of political and legal actors
benefit from data about policing. Local voters, police chiefs, and other
local officials who make police policy use empirical judgments to form
views about what that policy should be and whether it is being
effectively implemented.
State and federal legislatures and
administrative agencies use data to regulate the police further and also
to pursue other legal goals that can affect law enforcement. In their
sundry tasks, actors in these institutions make judgments about the
social and financial costs of particular policing strategies and about the
effectiveness and efficiency of those strategies in reducing fear, crime,
and public disorder. Explicitly or not, those judgments depend, first, on
assessments of conditions on the ground, such as the extent and costs of
crime, and, second, on predictions about the effects of alternative legal
rules and policing strategies. In this way, public policy and legal
decisions about policing depend heavily on empirical judgments. The
availability of data and research will determine how well-founded those
assessments are.
III. POLICYMAKERS, INCENTIVES, AND INFORMATION
The Third Degree authors viewed officer reluctance to provide
information to be the primary obstacle to a community informed about
its police department’s activities. They suggested that routinizing
26
Police officers act
information production would help, and it has.
much as Chafee and his co-authors imagined they would: they produce a
substantial amount of information about their activities pursuant to
departmental policies and procedures that mandate that they do so.
Thus, police officers write reports about their arrests, their uses of force,
and their responses to citizen calls for service, among other subjects.
They keep daily activity logs, arrest logs, and incident logs. In fact, part
27
of what it means to be a police officer is to write frequent reports. Yet,
despite this fact, the result The Third Degree authors envisioned has not
26. Chafee et al., supra note 2, at 191–92.
27. Every basic training academy teaches report writing to police recruits. See BRIAN A.
REAVES, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, STATE AND LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT TRAINING
ACADEMIES, 2006, at 6 tbl.11 (2009).
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come to pass. The information the public has about policing remains
quite limited.
The problem is that police officers are an easily overcome obstacle
to information collection, but cities and police departments are not.
Though officers will collect information when police chiefs and local
governments require them to do so, they will collect only that
information and only in the form mandated.
Moreover, that
information will only become public when chiefs or local governments
make it so (in the absence of state or federal law). In practice, police
chiefs and other local government actors often limit rather than promote
information availability. Cities and police departments sometimes
actively inhibit the collection of information about police by, for
example, requiring secrecy when they settle civil suits for police
misconduct or discouraging citizens from filing complaints about officer
28
Other times, police departments simply fail to produce
conduct.
records that could improve political and regulatory decision-making
29
about intrusive police activities. Thus, for example, departments often
require no reports for consensual searches or for Terry stops. Even
when departments collect information, they may do so in ways that
make it impossible to aggregate the records or compare them with data
from other departments. Departments often, for example, keep only
30
paper files and use anomalous report forms and categories, and they
are much more receptive to video cameras in police cars than to
31
collecting traffic stop data. Finally, even if data are kept, able to be

28. Marc L. Miller & Ronald F. Wright, Secret Police and the Mysterious Case of the
Missing Tort Claims, 52 BUFF. L. REV. 757, 760, 775–76 (2004) (discussing secrecy provisions
in civil settlements against police officers and departments); AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF
N.J., THE CRISIS INSIDE POLICE INTERNAL AFFAIRS 9–12 (2009) (discussing common ways
police departments inhibit citizens from filing complaints against police officers).
29. See, e.g., Joanna C. Schwartz, Myths and Mechanics of Deterrence: The Role of
Lawsuits in Law Enforcement Decisionmaking, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1023, 1045–52 (2010)
(discussing major departments that do not collect information regarding civil suits and
settlements for police misconduct).
30. See William A. Geller & Hans Toch, Understanding and Controlling Police Abuse of
Force, in POLICE VIOLENCE 292, 297–303 (William A. Geller & Hans Toch eds., 1996)
(describing the need for national data on the use of force, advocating improvements to the
current national data collection system, and recommending improving and standardizing
arrest reports, use of force reports, service calls, field contacts, and citizen complaint
procedures to permit useful national data for comparing departments).
31. E.g., Christine Won, Local Police Chiefs Talk about Racial Data Collection,
JOURNALTIMES.COM, Apr. 28, 2010, http://www.journaltimes.com/news/local/article_6a6ddca
c-52b6-11df-bb5d- 001cc4c03286.html.
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aggregated, and internally available, departments may refuse to release
32
them to the public. Thus, as a result of choices by police chiefs and
local government officials, voters, regulators, municipalities, and even
33
chiefs themselves lack basic information about police conduct.
This occurs because police chiefs and mayors have inadequate
incentives to provide many of the kinds of data that would facilitate
effective governance and regulation. In an ideal world, public decision
makers would invest in information until the marginal social benefit of
additional research for improved decision-making was equal to the
34
marginal social costs of additional research. But the reality is that
public actors who shape policing—from the officers themselves to local
politicians—often face incentives that undermine data collection and
research on policing as well as distribution of information about policing
to the public.
On one hand, better information can make policing more effective,
and those who develop and use such information are likely to be
rewarded for that success. A police chief who makes good policies as a
result of good investments in obtaining information can be rewarded
with a good reputation, increased professional independence, and an
35
extended and potentially lucrative career. Thus, there are significant

32. Those interested in information about police conduct often must litigate to obtain it.
See, e.g., Kristine Cordier Karnezis, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Application of
Statutory Provisions Relating to Public Access to Police Records, 82 A.L.R.3d 19, 23–24 (1978)
(collecting cases in which litigants seek information from police departments and are refused
unless required by state law to provide the information); Capital Newspapers Div. of Hearst
Corp. v. City of Albany, 63 A.D.3d 1336, 1336 (N.Y. App. Div. 2009) (involving refused
request for “documents pertaining to the alleged use of official Albany Police Department
channels to purchase military-style assault rifles for personal, nonofficial use by a number of
individual police officers in the 1990s.”); King Cnty. v. Sheehan, 57 P.3d 307, 310 (Wash. Ct.
App. 2002) (involving refused request for names and ranks of all police officers in
department); Adam Dunn & Patrick J. Caceres, Constructing a Better Estimate of Police
Misconduct, POL’Y MATTERS, Spring 2010, at 10, 14 (“Most police departments do not
publish data on misconduct . . . .”).
33. See, e.g., NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, FAIRNESS AND EFFECTIVENESS IN
POLICING: THE EVIDENCE 259–62 (Wesley G. Skogan & Kathleen Frydl eds., 2004)
[hereinafter FAIRNESS AND EFFECTIVENESS IN POLICING: THE EVIDENCE] (discussing
problems with data on excessive and lethal force); Geller & Toch, supra note 30, at 297–302;
Harmon, Promoting Civil Rights, supra note 7, at 28–34 (discussing problems with data
concerning police misconduct); Schwartz, supra note 29, at 1045–52.
34. Matthew C. Stephenson, Information Acquisition and Institutional Design, 124
HARV. L. REV. 1422, 1430 (2011).
35. Consider the success of William J. Bratton, who brought COMPSTAT to the New
York Police Department in the 1990s and is often credited with bringing down crime rates in
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incentives for police chiefs to collect and utilize data.
On the other hand, public agents often face significant counterincentives that can lead them to underinvest in research that could
improve policy.
Most significantly, police chiefs and politicians
experience much of the cost of increased investment in obtaining
information—in the form of delayed decision-making, opportunity costs,
and increased accountability—but usually internalize only some of the
36
benefits of improved policy. As a result, they are likely to devote
fewer resources to research and data collection than the public would
37
prefer.
Local chiefs and political agents face a particularly exaggerated
incentive gap for investments in information that require coordination
38
Collecting data that permit
across agencies and municipalities.
comparing the conduct of similar departments costs more, and the
additional benefits to the actors who must coordinate are limited. For
example, comparing how much force different police departments use
requires departments to coordinate on standardized forms, categories
39
for force, and methods for digitizing and aggregating the data. The
coordination necessary to create uniform standards and compliance with
those centralized norms both impose additional costs on police
departments. Unless the cooperation is widespread, there will be little
benefit from it, and even if it is widespread, each city will receive only a
fraction of the benefits created. It is also difficult to prevent freeloading by departments that do not comply fully with the standards.
As importantly, the same data that permit comparison across cities
and, therefore, better decision-making and assessment, can also be used
to increase accountability for ineffectual governance and to check selfinterested action by public officials. This gives chiefs and politicians a
further reason to avoid producing or making available this kind of

New York City as a result. Solomon Moore, Los Angeles Police Chief Is Quitting After 7
Years, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6, 2009, at A19. COMPSTAT is a data-driven geographically-based
accountability system for crime reduction and other policing goals. Id. After implementing
COMPSTAT in New York, Bratton went on to lead the New York Police Department and
the Los Angeles Police Department and now has a successful career in the private security
sector. Id.
36. Stephenson, supra note 34, at 1431.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 1464–68 (discussing particular challenges of acquiring information and making
decisions when multiple agents are participating in the process).
39. See supra notes 27–28 and accompanying text.
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data. 40 As a result, regulators and chiefs will frequently avoid collecting
or coordinating information that would allow voters or regulators to
compare departments. Thus, we have little basis for judging how well
chiefs avoid using force.
In this way, police chiefs generate agency costs, both when they
pursue personal agendas rather than those of the voting public, and also
when they deprive the public and other political actors of information
that can be used to detect the agency costs they impose. They can limit
public information either by refraining from collecting the information
or by making it difficult to access and use. Both methods inhibit
scrutiny of the chiefs’ conduct, making it more difficult for the public to
enforce its preferences about policing policy.
In sum, information is crucial to the project of policing. The public
needs research and data to inform its preferences about the amounts
and kinds of policing the local department should do. Police chiefs and
local policy makers need information to make good policy choices. And
state and federal courts, legislatures, and agencies need information
about policing in setting criminal justice law and policy, in formulating
law that incidentally affects the police, and in attempting to mitigate the
costs of policing and the agency costs that local governance might entail.
However, public choice problems and coordination difficulties lead to
less production and distribution of information on policing than political
actors and regulators need. The policing we have is likely less effective
and more socially and economically costly as a result.
III. FEDERAL LAW AND INFORMATION ABOUT THE POLICE
Today, much more than at the time of the Wickersham Commission,
state and federal actors have tools to promote data production when
local actors do not. In practice, however, state and federal efforts to
collect information about policing have been surprisingly limited.
States—which regulate extensively how police officers are trained,
hired, and disciplined—demand very little information about what
40. See, e.g., Editorial, They Like Transparency, Until They Don’t, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14,
2011, at A28 (“In recent years, the New York Civil Liberties Union had to sue to get stopand-frisk data from the police, details on the race of people shot by officers and shooting
reports since 1997. Most recently, the group has filed a suit on behalf of an online columnist
asking for Police Commissioner Raymond Kelly’s calendar. . . . Similarly, The Times was
forced to go to court to get fuller access to police data. A judge ruled early last month that
the New York Police Department had improperly withheld information about pistol owners
and the locations of hate crimes.”).
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police officers do. Federal law appears to do more, since federal
agencies have been tasked by Congress with collecting data about
policing. But agency efforts to collect national information about
policing have focused far too narrowly to serve the interests of those
governing and regulating the police.
States presently mandate that police departments collect some kinds
of data through state executive orders, legislation, and administrative
regulations. However, these efforts have been limited to a few subject
areas and are often the product of lawsuits. Thus, while some states
have incident-based crime reporting systems for specific crimes and
some collect law enforcement data to help detect racial profiling in
traffic stops, there are few other kinds of data collection about police
41
In fact, states not only do little to
conduct common to states.
encourage police departments to produce information about policing
that does exist, they also often restrict public access to it through privacy
42
laws and exemptions from open records statutes.
One can argue that state legislators face incentives better aligned
with the public’s interest in investing in information about police
conduct than those of local police chiefs, mayors, and city council
members. After all, law enforcement issues play a lesser role in state
elections and state officials can more easily coordinate across agencies
and develop law enforcement expertise. But law enforcement interests
can be powerfully influential at the state level, and data production may
43
have fewer policy benefits for state actors than local voters or officials.
As a result, in data production, as in other areas, state law plays a
limited role in the regulation of local policing.
Federal efforts would seem more promising. National coordination
is much easier to achieve at the federal level, and Congress has long
44
been active in regulating local law enforcement. Several offices in the
U.S. Department of Justice have been tasked with ensuring that we have

41. E.g., MO. ANN. STAT. §§ 590.650, 590.653 (West 2011); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 31-21.14(a)(2) (2010); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 2.131–.132 (West 2003); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 43.43.480 (West 2006); JUSTICE RESEARCH & STATISTICS ASS’N, USE OF
DATA IN POLICE DEPARTMENTS: A SURVEY OF POLICE CHIEFS AND DATA ANALYSTS 6–7
(2005) (discussing limited state data collection on crime).
42. See Harmon, The Problem, supra note 7, at 808; Steven D. Zansberg & Pamela
Campos, Sunshine on the Thin Blue Line: Public Access to Police Internal Affairs Files,
COMM. LAW., Fall 2004, at 34–35.
43. See Harmon, The Problem, supra note 7, at 813–14.
44. See id. at 814–16.
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adequate knowledge about local law enforcement. 45 Nevertheless,
federal data collection and research falls far short of what would be
needed to assure informed decision-making on policing because the
administrative agencies responsible for that data collection are heavily
influenced by law enforcement interests.
Federal law authorizes federal agencies to produce data on law
enforcement, but those data are not well tailored to facilitate public
accountability, strengthen local governance, or improve state and
federal regulation of the police. The most important national source of
data about the criminal justice system is the Uniform Crime Report.
Pursuant to the Uniform Crime Reporting program (UCR), the FBI
46
“[o]perate[s] a central clearinghouse for police statistics” intended to
provide a national indicator of the incidence of crime in the United
47
States. Although focused on the incidence of crime, the UCR provides
some information that could be useful for evaluations of law
48
enforcement, including some employee data and case clearance rates.
45. The mission and function of the Bureau of Justice Statistics is to “collect, analyze,
publish, and disseminate information on crime, criminal offenders, victims of crime, and the
operation of justice systems at all levels of government” to assist policymaking in combating
crime and ensuing that justice is “efficient and evenhanded.” About the Bureau of Justice
Statistics, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/index.cfm?ty=abu (last
visited Feb. 27, 2013). The mission of the Office of Justice Programs is to “provide[]
innovative leadership to federal, state, local, and tribal justice systems, by disseminating stateof-the art knowledge and practices across America, and providing grants for the
implementation of these crime fighting strategies.” About Us, OFFICE OF JUSTICE
PROGRAMS, http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/about/about.htm (last visited Feb. 27, 2013). The
National Institute of Justice, which is the research, development and evaluation agency of the
Department of Justice, is “dedicated to improving knowledge and understanding of crime and
justice issues through science” in order to provide “knowledge and tools to reduce crime and
promote justice, particularly at the state and local levels.” About NIJ, NAT’L INST. OF
JUSTICE, http://www.nij.gov/about/welcome.htm (last visited Feb. 25, 2013). The mission of
the FBI National Academy is “to support, promote, and enhance the personal and
professional development of law enforcement leaders by preparing them for complex,
dynamic, and contemporary challenges through innovative techniques, facilitating excellence
in education and research, and forging partnerships throughout the world.” The FBI
Academy, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/training/nationalacademy (last visited Feb. 27 2013). The Federal Law Enforcement Training Center is an
“interagency law enforcement training organization for 91 Federal agencies” that also
“provides services to state, local, tribal, and international law enforcement agencies.”
Welcome to FLETC, FED. LAW ENFORCEMENT TRAINING CENTER, http://www.fletc.gov/
(last visited Feb. 27, 2013).
46. 28 C.F.R. § 0.85(f) (2012).
47. Uniform Federal Crime Reporting Act of 1988, 28 U.S.C. §§ 534(a)(1), (f) (2006).
48. See, e.g., FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CRIME IN THE
UNITED STATES, 2011: OFFENSES CLEARED 1 (2012), available at http://www.fbi.gov/about-
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Police departments provide data for the UCR voluntarily and have
conflicting incentives in reporting crimes, given that such data can be
used to evaluate agency effectiveness. The FBI has made only tepid
efforts to ensure the integrity of UCR data, and many have expressed
49
concern about the value of the data.
The UCR gets its data through the National Incident-Based
Reporting System (NIBRS), a system intended to “take advantage of
available crime data maintained in modern law enforcement records
50
systems,” and by the older Summary Reporting System (SRS), under
which police departments provide much less detail to the FBI. For each
of forty-six specific crimes, the NIBRS collects data on offense, victim,
property, and arrestee. Starting in 1988, the FBI began to encourage
departments to use NIBRS in place of the SRS. But NIBRS has been of
limited success. Some states have not yet implemented it, many
departments have not yet supplied data to the FBI through NIBRS, and
those departments that do supply data through NIBRS may not report
51
all incidents. Beyond these weaknesses, it is notable that NIBRS was
never intended to collect the rest of the data available in modern law
enforcement records systems, including data about case clearance, the
extent and kind of contact between police and victims and offenders,
officers’ duties and supervision, the nature and result of disciplinary
proceedings; citizen complaints; and information about police responses
to service calls. The creation and implementation of NIBRS provided
an important opportunity to promote collection and aggregation of data

us/cjis/ucr/crime-in-the-u.s/2011/crime-in-the-u.s.-2011/clearancetopic_final.pdf;
FED.
BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES, 2011:
POLICE EMPLOYEES 1 (2012), available at http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/crime-in-theu.s/2011/crime-in-the-u.s.-2011/policeemployees_main_final.pdf.
49. James P. Lynch & John P. Jarvis, Missing Data and Imputation in the Uniform Crime
Reports and the Effects on National Estimates, 24 J. CONTEMPORARY CRIM. JUST. 69, 69
(2008) (noting that questions have arisen about the quality of uniform crime reporting data
and citing criticisms).
50. FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE , UNIFORM CRIME
REPORTING HANDBOOK 3 (2004) [hereinafter UNIFORM CRIME REPORTING HANDBOOK].
IBR
RESOURCE
CENTER,
51. Status
of
NIBRS
in
the
States,
http://www.jrsa.org/ibrrc/background-status/nibrs_states.shtml (last visited Feb. 27, 2013)
(“As of June 2012, 32 states have been certified to report NIBRS to the FBI, and three
additional states and the District of Columbia have individual agencies submitting NIBRS
data. Fifteen states are only submitting incident-based data, covering 100% of their state law
enforcement agencies. Approximately 29% of the population is covered by NIBRS
reporting, representing 27% of the nation's reported crime and 43% of law enforcement
agencies.”).
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useful to those seeking to govern law enforcement as well as to those
interested solely in facilitating it. That opportunity passed unrealized,
and the federal government does not collect or analyze most of the
extensive data produced by police departments through incident and
arrest reports, COMPSTAT, Early Intervention Systems, and other
computer databases that might provide a basis for governing or
52
regulating the police.
It is unsurprising that UCR and NIBRS are not tailored to produce
data helpful in governing the police. After all, the FBI conceives of
police departments as the consumers of UCR data rather than its
53
subjects. There is another agency tasked with collecting information
about law enforcement as well as for it. Congress created the Bureau of
Justice Statistics within the Office of Justice Programs of the U.S.
Department of Justice to produce and disseminate information about
the criminal justice system, including law enforcement. BJS has broad
54
statutory authority to collect and analyze data about crime and the
operation of the criminal justice system, and to provide that information
55
to federal, state, and local governments, as well as the general public.
The agency is also authorized to promote data production and analytic
capacity in police departments and in local and state governments by,
56
for example, “recommend[ing] national standards for justice statistics,”
57
and by improving local computer information systems. Thus, BJS can
and is intended to produce and promote the kinds information the
public, local governments, and state and federal actors need to govern
52. See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, ENSURING THE QUALITY, CREDIBILITY, AND
RELEVANCE OF U.S. JUSTICE STATISTICS 205 (Robert M. Groves & Daniel L. Cork eds.,
2009) (proposing that BJS become involved in “compiling crime data from local
departments” that already collect such information electronically). Federal law also fails to
promote uniformity in the generation of the data that would facilitate aggregation. Thus,
even if UCR crime data were perfect, it would be of limited use in evaluating, governing, and
regulating police conduct.
53. The purpose of the uniform crime reporting effort is to “present a nationwide view
of crime.” UNIFORM CRIME REPORTING HANDBOOK, supra note 50, at 1. Furthermore,
“[t]he culmination of [the Uniform Crime Report] national data collection effort is three
annual publications: Crime in the United States, Hate Crime Statistics, and Law Enforcement
Officers Killed and Assaulted, all of which have become sources of data widely used by law
enforcement administrators, government policy makers, social science researchers, the media,
and private citizens.” Id.
54. 42 U.S.C. § 3732(c)(3) (2006).
55. § 3732(c)(10).
56. § 3732(c)(8).
57. § 3732(c)(13).
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policing. In practice, however, these data too are not tailored to the
governance or regulatory needs described in Part I.
BJS does provide some extremely relevant data. It conducts the
National Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS), which is an essential
complement to the FBI’s Uniform Crime Reports in painting a national
58
portrait of serious criminal activity. Thus, BJS, like the FBI, helps to
gather nationally comparable crime data that can begin to build a basis
for more effective governance and policy making about policing. BJS
also adds a triennial supplement to the NCVS, the Police-Public Contact
Survey (PPCS). The PPCS was originally intended to facilitate study the
59
of excessive force by law enforcement officers, and it continues to
provide revealing data about the nature, frequency, and context of
contacts between the police and the public, as well as the views of the
public about those interactions, which could be used to compare a
60
BJS’s data gathering
department’s practices to national averages.
efforts, however, suffer from a variety of shortcomings, both by design
and due to resource limitations and execution problems, which limit
their value in critical ways.
BJS’s primary data-gathering tool on law enforcement is the Law
Enforcement Management and Administrative Statistics (LEMAS)
61
The survey is given to all
survey, conducted every three years.
agencies with 100 or more sworn officers and to a stratified random
62
sample of agencies with fewer than 100 sworn officers. The survey’s

58. See FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEPT’T OF JUSTICE, CRIME IN THE
UNITED STATES 2004: UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS 510 app. IV (2004), available at
http://www2.fbi.gov/ucr/cius_04/documents/CIUS2004.pdf (“Each of these programs produces
valuable information about aspects of the Nation’s crime problem . . . . [T]he information
they produce together provides a more comprehensive panorama of the Nation’s crime
problem than either could produce alone.”).
59. 42 U.S.C. § 14142(a) (instructing the Attorney General to “acquire data about the
use of excessive force by law enforcement officers”).
60. E.g., CHRISTINE EITH & MATTHEW R. DUROSE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
CONTACTS BETWEEN POLICE AND THE PUBLIC, 2008, at 1 (2011), available at
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/cpp08.pdf (summarizing the findings of the 2008
PPCS and noting highlights such as that an “estimated 9 out of 10 residents who had contact
with police in 2008 felt the police acted properly” but that a “majority of the people who had
force used or threatened against them said they felt it was excessive”).
61. “Conducted every 3 to 4 years, LEMAS collects data from over 3,000 state and local
law enforcement agencies . . . .” Data Collection: Law Enforcement Management and
Administrative Statistics (LEMAS), BUREAU JUST. STAT., http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/index.cfm?t
y=dcdetail&iid=248 (last revised Apr. 19, 2010).
62. E.g., BRIAN A. REAVES, LOCAL POLICE DEPARTMENTS, 2007, at 8 (2010), available
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questions are generally multiple choice and are “intended to be filled
63
out with relatively little need to refer to available records,” a measure
of its limited scope. The LEMAS survey focuses on administrative
matters such as employee counts and demographics, budgets, technical
64
resources, and some specific policies. In addition, every four years,
BJS conducts a Census of State and Local Law Enforcement Agencies,
the main purpose of which is to produce a sampling frame for the
65
LEMAS survey. This survey collects information on all state and local
law enforcement agencies, but is limited to a two-page questionnaire
about matters such as the number of sworn and civilian employees in the
agency, the agency’s functions and primary activities, and its budget
66
level. BJS has also twice conducted a Census of Law Enforcement
Training Academies, which provides important information about the
67
kind and amount of training provided to law enforcement officers. In
at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/lpd07.pdf (“The selected local police sample
includes all departments employing 100 or more full-time sworn personnel and a systematic
random sample of smaller agencies stratified by size.”).
63. Groves & Cork, supra note 52, at 109.
64. Data Collection: Law Enforcement Management and Administrative Statistics
(LEMAS), supra note 61 (“Data are obtained on the organization and administration of
police and sheriffs’ departments, including agency responsibilities, operating expenditures,
job functions of sworn and civilian employees, officer salaries and special pay, demographic
characteristics of officers, weapons and armor policies, education and training requirements,
computers and information systems, vehicles, special units, and community policing
activities.”).
65. See id.; see also BRIAN A. REAVES, CENSUS OF STATE AND LOCAL LAW
ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES, 2008, at 1, 12 (2011), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/
pub/pdf/csllea08.pdf [hereinafter REAVES, 2008]. BJS also conducts more focused surveys of
special law enforcement agencies such as campus police forces and coroners’ offices. E.g.,
MATTHEW J. HICKMAN ET AL., MEDICAL EXAMINERS AND CORONERS’ OFFICES, 2004
(2007), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/meco04.pdf; BRIAN A. REAVES,
CAMPUS LAW ENFORCEMENT, 2004–05 (2008) [hereinafter REAVES, 2008], available at
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/cle0405.pdf.
66. See REAVES, 2008, supra note 65, at 12 (“Employment data are reported by agencies
for sworn and nonsworn (civilian) personnel and, within these categories, by full-time or parttime status. Agencies also complete a checklist of functions they regularly perform, or have
primary responsibility for, within the following areas: patrol and response, criminal
investigation, traffic and vehicle-related functions, detention-related functions, court-related
functions, special public safety functions (e.g., animal control), task force participation, and
specialized functions (e.g., search and rescue).”); U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 2000 CENSUS OF
STATE AND LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES: LAW ENFORCEMENT MANAGEMENT
AND ADMINISTRATIVE STATISTICS (2003), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/p
df/cj38sp.pdf.
67. See MATTHEW J. HICKMAN, U.S. DEPT’ OF JUSTICE, STATE AND LOCAL LAW
ENFORCEMENT TRAINING ACADEMIES, 2002, at iv (2005), available at
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addition, BJS has occasionally solicited information about state law
enforcement agencies policies with respect to recording data on race in
68
traffic stops.
Unfortunately, due to the limited scope of the collection efforts, the
data BJS produces do not reveal a national picture about police policies
or practices or about the costs and benefits of policing as it is carried out
today. We do not know enough about what police do to assess which
practices best reduce crime and disorder or which practices are least
intrusive. Without such information, local governments cannot easily
choose effective and harm-efficient policing strategies, and states and
federal legislatures cannot incentivize them to do so. Part of the
problem is resources. BJS has a much smaller budget than other federal
69
statistical bureaus and yet has a much larger mandate. Largely as a
result, even in the area in which it is most active, crime data, and
certainly with respect to law enforcement practices and policies, its
survey lacks subnational geographic detail and questions tailored for
effective policy making. In addition, in the face of increasing costs and a
flat budget, BJS has cut corners over the years, leading to degraded
70
rather than strengthened products.
Even within existing resources, BJS’s triennial law enforcement
survey suffers from an extremely narrow focus. As a recent National
Research Council report concluded:
BJS’s work in law enforcement is hindered by a sharp and overly
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/slleta02.pdf; BRIAN A. REAVES, U.S. DEP’T OF
JUSTICE, STATE AND LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT TRAINING ACADEMIES, 2006, at 1–6
(2009), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/slleta06.pdf.
68. Groves & Cork, supra note 52, at 119 (describing efforts of the BJS to collect
information from state police agencies “about policies for recording data on race and
ethnicity of persons stopped on traffic violations”); e.g., MATTHEW J. HICKMAN, U.S. DEP’T
OF JUSTICE, TRAFFIC STOP DATA COLLECTION POLICIES FOR STATE POLICE, 2004, at 1
(2005), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/tsdcp04.pdf.
69. See Groves & Cork, supra note 52, at 19 (“BJS has been given more responsibilities
than can be achieved with current resources. The resources provided to BJS to carry out its
work are not commensurate with the breadth—and importance—of the responsibilities
assigned to the agency by its authorizing legislation.”); id. at 209–10 (describing the funding
levels of the principal statistical agencies of the federal government). The National Center
for Education Statistics, the primary federal education statistics agency, for example, has
direct funding levels several times that of the Bureau of Justice Statistics, as does the national
Center for Health Statistics, the Energy Information Administration, the National
Agricultural Statistics Service, and others.
70. Id. at 19–21 (discussing the implications of the fiscal constraints BJS has faced over
the years).
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restrictive focus on management and administrative issues; its
analysis of law enforcement generally lacks direct connection to
data on crime, much less providing the basis for assessing the
quality and effectiveness of police programs. It is also in the area
of law enforcement, with the proliferation of numerous specialagency censuses and little semblance of a fixed schedule or
interconnectedness of series, where the need for refining the
conceptual framework for multiple data collections is most
evident. 71
Beyond management and administrative information, BJS’s efforts
to uncover information about law enforcement are modest: The Contact
72
Survey focuses primarily on the basis for traffic stops and uses of force.
The survey of state police agencies on traffic stops has been conducted
only twice, and asked only about policies with respect to collecting race
and ethnicity data, not about the number of stops or the justification for
73
them. The survey of training academies asks about how many hours of
training are devoted to different subjects, but little about the content of
the training. As the National Research Council concluded, “[a] look at
BJS’s portfolio . . . leaves the unfortunate impression that the state of
knowledge about ‘law enforcement’ generally can be equated with the
head- and resource-count totals in the LEMAS survey and agency
74
censuses.” As a result, “BJS reports [are] silent on the most basic
notions of effectiveness of police policies or personnel decisions,” much
75
less the harm-efficiency of those departmental practices. Furthermore,
the problem is self-reinforcing: BJS now produces the statistics made
76
possible by its now well-established instruments, rather than basing

71. Id. at 133.
72. E.g., Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2008 PPCS Final Questionnaire 1–2, available at
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/ppcs08_q.pdf.
73. E.g., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 2001 STATE POLICE TRAFFIC STOP DATA
COLLECTION PROCEDURES, available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/ssp1q.pdf.
74. Groves & Cork, supra note 52, at 146.
75. Id. at 147. When BJS expresses concern about the scope of its own law enforcement
efforts, it focuses almost exclusively on producing more data on force used by the police and
to a lesser degree, on citizen complaints. See, e.g., Jeffrey Sedgwick & Gerard Ramker, U.S.
Dep’t of Justice, BJS Provides Update on Projects and Priorities, JRSA FORUM, June 2007, at
3, available at http://www.jrsa.org/pubs/forum/forum_issues/for25_2.pdf. Others have been
more critical. See Dunn & Caceres, supra note 32, at 11 (“The bureau’s narrow focus likely
leads to a substantial undercounting of incidents of police misconduct.”).
76. Groves & Cork, supra note 52, at 146 (“Law enforcement statistics within BJS have
been largely defined by the specific LEMAS data collection vehicle, and not a substantive
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BJS’s data collection efforts on a thick conception about the purpose of
law enforcement data. There have been proposals to improve federal
law enforcement data collection to make it more usable for police policy
77
evaluation, but as of yet they have gone unheeded.
Notwithstanding the inadequacy of BJS’s own data collection efforts,
the Bureau also has both authority and funding to promote data
collection by police departments and state and local governments that
78
could be the basis of improved policing. However, the State Justice
Statistics program grants overwhelmingly promote databases for
criminal law enforcement rather than databases that could be used to
compare departments, to evaluate the costs and benefits of law
79
enforcement practices, or for other governance and regulatory goals.
definition of the activities and actors that constitute law enforcement.”).
77. E.g., FAIRNESS AND EFFECTIVENESS IN POLICING: THE EVIDENCE, supra note 33,
at 329 (“The committee recommends expanding data collection to encompass a wider range
of policing outcomes, to enable the monitoring of the quality of police service and not just its
quantity.”).
78. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 3732(c)(1), (13) (2006) (authorizing the Bureau to make grants and
authorizing the Bureau to “provide for the development of justice information systems
programs and assistance to the States and units of local government relating to collection,
analysis, or dissemination of justice statistics”).
79. The State Justice Statistics Program includes the following themes that state
Statistical Analysis Centers can choose:
1. Deaths in Police Custody Reporting - Obtaining statewide data on deaths
occurring in the process of arrest or in pursuit of arrest.
2. Criminal justice system crisis planning
3. Increased access to data
4. Performance measurement
5. Analyses utilizing a state's criminal history records
6. Statewide crime victimization surveys
7. Analysis of the uses of new or emerging biometric technologies to improve the
administration of criminal justice
8. Research using incident-based crime data that are compatible with the National
Incident-Based Reporting System (NIBRS)
9. Data collection and/or research examining a special topical area:
a. Minority overrepresentation in the criminal or juvenile justice
systems
b. Civil justice
c. Cybercrime
d. Human trafficking
e. Justice issues in Indian Country
f. Criminal activity in U.S. border areas
g. Violent crime in schools
h. The impact of substance abuse on state and/or local criminal
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Thus, we have the Crime Identification Technology Act of 1988, the
National Criminal History Improvement Program, the NICS
Improvement Amendments Act of 2007 and similar statutes and grant
programs that seek to improve automated fingerprint identification
systems, instant criminal background check systems, and other
computerized systems about crime, forensics, and criminals, but little
support for a national database of police officers decertified by state
administrative mechanisms and none for a database of civil suits and
80
BJS has not offered
consent decrees against police departments.
grants to promote uniform data collection by states from police
departments on law enforcement subjects (other than crime), or to
facilitate research on the non-financial costs of law enforcement
81
techniques.
BJS and the FBI produce narrow data because of institutional
constraints. Like local law enforcement and political actors, these
federal agencies, and the federal legislators responsible for creating and
overseeing them, have inadequate incentives to produce optimal
amounts of information about policing. Inadequate data collection
efforts are a symptom of that problem. The FBI, the flagship federal
policing agency, depends on close cooperation with local law
enforcement for its work, and is thus ill-situated to collect data and
justice and public health systems
i. Family violence and/or stalking
State Justice Statistics Program, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov
/index.cfm?ty=tp&tid=48 (last visited Mar. 24, 2013). BJS has awarded some grants to allow
states to improve performance assessment tools that might include law enforcement.
80. The Crime Identification Technology Act of 1998, Pub. L. 105-251, § 102, 112 Stat.
1870, 1871 (1998). Similarly, “BJS provides direct awards and technical assistance to states
and localities to improve the quality, timeliness, and immediate accessibility of criminal
history records and related information” through the National Criminal History
Improvement Program. National Criminal History Improvement Program, BUREAU OF
JUSTICE STATISTICS, http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/index.cfm?ty=tp&tid=47 (last revised Feb. 28,
2013).
81. See, e.g., BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OMB NO. 11210329, 2010 SURVEY OF GENERAL PURPOSE LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES
SOLICITATION(2010), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/sgplea10sol.pdf;
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FY 2009 NATIONAL CRIMINAL
HISTORY IMPROVEMENT PROGRAM (NCHIP) SOLICITATION (2009), available at
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/nchip09sol.pdf; BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS,
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OMB NO. 1121-0323, RECOVERY ACT (2009), available at
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/recoveryact09.pdf. Even in the areas that BJS does
promote information technology for state and local police agencies, the agency has not always
furthered the national project of data collection.
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shape research to allow other political actors to supervise those
departments.
Perhaps more surprisingly, given its duties, BJS is also structurally
hobbled. First, because the Director of BJS is politically appointed and
serves an unspecified term at the pleasure of the President, and because
BJS is located within the Justice Department, BJS is subject to political
influence that is likely to be favorable to law enforcement interests.
This is best evidenced by events surrounding a 2005 press release
announcing the results of the 2002 Police Public Contact Survey. The
BJS draft of the press release provided statistics indicating that the
likelihood of being stopped by police in 2002 did not differ significantly
between white, black, and Hispanic drivers, but that police were more
likely to carry out some type of search or use of force on a black or
82
Hispanic driver. The then-Assistant Attorney General ordered the
Director of BJS to delete references to the higher rates of searches and
uses of force for black and Hispanic drivers. The BJS Director refused
83
and was dismissed from his position. The report was issued without a
press release and languished until news reporting over the Director’s
84
firing drew attention to it. The next PPCS survey results were released
82. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-07-340, BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS: QUALITY GUIDELINES GENERALLY FOLLOWED FOR POLICE-PUBLIC
CONTACT SURVEYS, BUT OPPORTUNITIES EXIST TO HELP ASSURE AGENCY
INDEPENDENCE 21–22 (2007) (“The press release that BJS sought to publish would have
included the following statistical findings from the accompanying Police-Public Contact
Survey report: (1) there was no statistically significant difference between the rates that white
and minority drivers reported being stopped by police, and (2) once stopped, a larger
percentage of black and Hispanic minority drivers reported police using or threatening to use
force against them than did whites.”).
83. See Eric Lichtblau, Democrats Want Official to Be Reinstated Over Report on
Profiling, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 26, 2005, at A11 (“Democrats in Congress called . . . for the
reinstatement of a Justice Department official who objected to his supervisors’ effort to play
down the findings of a federal report on racial profiling.”); Eric Lichtblau, Profiling Report
Leads to a Clash and a Demotion, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 24, 2005, at A1 (“The Bush
administration is replacing the director of a small but critical branch of the Justice
Department, months after he complained that senior political officials at the department were
seeking to play down newly compiled data on the aggressive police treatment of black and
Hispanic drivers.”).
84. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 82, at 21–22 (“Despite reported
efforts on the part of both parties to negotiate alternative language with respect to the
content of the press release, they could not resolve their differences and the BJS Director
decided that a press release would not be issued.”); Groves & Cork, supra note 52, at 227–28
(“In August 2005, the New York Times, followed by other media outlets, reported on a string
of events over the previous 4 months that culminated in the removal of BJS Director
Lawrence Greenfeld. The removal was precipitated by disputes within the Justice
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with a statement noting that black and Hispanic drivers were more
likely to be searched but without statistics detailing the matter. The
release emphasized that “such racial disparities do not necessarily
demonstrate that police treat people differently based on race or other
demographic characteristics” and noted explicitly that the study “did not
85
take into account other factors that might explain these disparities.”
Without more independence from political influence, it is difficult to
imagine BJS providing the data necessary to ensure police
accountability.
Second, BJS’s location inside the Office of Justice Programs
potentially distorts its mission. The Office of Justice Programs is tasked
with “provid[ing] information to the President, the Congress, the
judiciary, State and local governments, and the general public relating to
86
This mission seems ideally suited to ensuring
criminal justice.”
adequate information for public governance and state and local
regulation of police departments. But in practice OJP orients itself to a
more circumscribed audience and therefore a more limited subject
matter.
OJP is the successor to the Law Enforcement Assistance
Administration, and its primary function is to provide grants to state
87
Rather than serve both law
and local law enforcement agencies.
enforcement and those who govern and regulate it, OJP remains
oriented toward serving law enforcement. It seeks “[t]o be the premier
resource for the justice community by: [(1)] [p]roviding and
coordinating information, research and development, statistics, training,
and support to help the justice community build the capacity it needs to
meet its public safety goals,” and “[(2)] [e]mbracing local decisionmaking, while encouraging local innovation through [strong and
88
intelligent] national policy leadership.” It also focuses on “provid[ing]
Department over the statement of findings from the [Police Public Contact Survey].”
(internal citations omitted)).
85. Press Release, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Police Stop White, Black and Hispanic
Drivers at Similar Rates According to Department of Justice Report (Apr. 29, 2007),
available at http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/press/cpp05pr.cfm.
86. 42 U.S.C. § 3712(a)(3) (2006) (listing the authorities of the assistant attorney general
heading the Office of Justice Programs); see § 3711 (establishing OJP within the Justice
Department with an assistant attorney general as its head).
87. Groves & Cork, supra note 52, at 40 (“BJS inherits a strong focus of attention on the
needs of state and local law enforcement, since OJP is the legal successor of the previous Law
Enforcement Assistance Administration.”).
OF
JUST.
PROGRAMS,
88. Mission
and
Vision,
OFFICE
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Federal leadership in developing the nation’s capacity to prevent and
89
control crime, administer justice, and assist crime victims.”
BJS’s funding is a small piece of OJP’s budget, and generally, it is
90
allocated internally within OJP rather than from outside it. Since OJP
is oriented towards law enforcement, and BJS must compete with grant
programs within OJP for resources, it is not surprising that BJS too is
oriented towards data useful for crime control rather than ensuring that
the costs of law enforcement practices are worth their benefits. OJP—
like the FBI—serves police departments more than it serves those who
might govern and regulate law enforcement: the public, municipal policy
makers, state police standards and training boards, state legislatures, the
91
federal judiciary, and Congress.
As a result, BJS plays too limited a role in producing information
useful for governing or regulating policing. The data BJS provide an
inadequate basis for assessing the effectiveness of law enforcement
techniques, the financial and non-financial costs of existing and
alternative law enforcement approaches, and the incentives facing law
enforcement actors, among other information essential to effectively
evaluating policing strategies. Moreover, though the interests of law
enforcement and the interests of the public and political actors who
regulate law enforcement are often aligned in favor of effective crime
control, as noted in Parts I and II, those groups’ interests can also
diverge both substantively and with respect to the dissemination of
information. This suggests that without external support, the needed
data will never materialize.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Third Degree was a remarkable accomplishment. It brought to
national consciousness a long-standing problem of policing and led to

http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/about/mission.htm (last visited Feb. 28, 2013).
89. See Leigh Benda, Foreword to OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, U.S. DEP’T OF
JUSTICE,
2011
FINANCIAL
GUIDE
(Revised
July
2012),
available
at
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/financialguide/PDFs/OCFO_2012FinancialGuide.pdf.
90. See Groves & Cork, supra note 52, at 40 (“Administratively, BJS is an organ of OJP
within the U.S. Department of Justice.”).
91. Moreover, BJS’s connection to law enforcement interests is not entirely external.
While the PPCS has its origins in Congressional efforts to facilitate better regulation of police
uses of force, the LEMAS survey—the most important of its data collection tools—has its
origins in earlier police salary and administration surveys conducted by the Kansas City
Police Department and the Fraternal Order of the Police.
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reforms that reduced the problem. In its last paragraphs, the report
suggests some of the complexity of the relationship among law, politics,
and policing: law is a check on police conduct, but it must be enforced to
make a difference; political will facilitates enforcement, but requires
information; police officers will not always generate or share adequate
information about policing, but they are necessarily part of the project
of doing so. The tasks of governing and regulating the police continue
today, and in light of the intricate web of local, state, and federal laws
affecting the police, they are more complicated than ever.
These tasks are not at odds with promoting good policing, but rather
are essential to it. Both local governance and state and federal
regulation are necessary to ensure that publicly-provided policing is
effective and yet minimally harmful and costly. Even more than the
report’s authors imagined, information is a precondition for achieving
these tasks, and federal data collection tailored to governing and
regulating the police is a necessary component of that information. As
of yet, the agencies responsible for that data collection do not
recognize—much less fulfill—this mission. Until they do, our policing
policy will suffer.

